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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
SUSAN H. EARLY, 
Respondent/Plaintiff 
v. 
DAVID W. EARLY, 
Appellant/Defendant 
CASE NO. 890306-CA 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
) 
The appellant, David W. Early, herewith replies to the 
brief of the respondent as follows: 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: 
ERRORS AS TO THE TAX DEBT ON THE REAL PROPERTY 
In respondent's brief on this issue, she first argues that 
"taxes were accruing on the residence each day that this lawsuit 
was pending. In fact, the taxes were a lien upon the resident 
as of January 1, 1988." (Respondent's brief, p. 8) While it is 
true that taxes become a lien upon the property as of January 1st 
of each year, it is not true that taxes accrue each day. 
The mere fact that a lien is created does not mean that the 
taxes are accruing. All a lien does is give the taxing entity 
a right to resort to the property for the payment of the taxes 
due if the owner does not voluntarily pay same. Anson v. 
Ellison, 140 P2d. 653 (Utah, 1943) This has long been the law 
in Utah. The existence of a lien on the property is conditional 
and subject to various limitations. Anson v. Ellison, supra., at 
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p. 656. It is well settled in this state that "until levy and 
assessment are made, there is no tax lien on realty; but when made, 
the tax relates back to the owner as of noon, January 1st of 
the taxable year." Huntington City v. Peterson, 518 P2d 1246, 
at 1248 (Utah, 1974) 
It is certainly clear, then, that no tax was accruing on a 
daily basis upon the property. The assessments are not mailed 
out to the property owners until July (59-2-919, U.C.A.), and the 
final tax bills are not mailed until shortly before the November 
1st deadline. (59-2-1317, U.C.A.) As a practical matter, all 
tax bills to property owners in Utah are mailed during the month 
of October. Salt Lake County doesn't start mailing their bills 
until the second week in October, as all property owners in the 
county are well aware. Thus, the Earlys may not have even received 
their tax notice until after the Decree of Divorce was entered. 
Since there was no monthly impound for taxes by a mortgage company 
or other lender, and since the tax bill was not received by the 
parties until October, Mr. Early cannot be expected to pay for 
a non-existent debt. The debt was not due until November 30th. 
This is the due date. While the tax fee may have been paid 
earlier, after the tax notice was mailed and received, if we are 
to fix a "due date" it would have to be November 30th. 
The respondent finally argues that the district court was 
in the best position to rule on its intent in the order. This 
really isn't true. The provision dealing with the taxes was part 
of Commissioner Peuler's recommendation (R.318), and while the 
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respondent did object to some points of the recommendation (R.321), 
she did not object to this portion of the recommendation. Thus, 
Judge Moffat in his subsequent Order (R.398) never even 
considered this issue. He would therefore be in no position 
to interpret the point in issue as being one of his own making. 
While we may debate due dates, and other such matters, 
it would seem that the real issue to be decided is the intent 
of the court. It would seem clear that the intent of the 
court was to provide for the payment of certain debts as they 
may have accrued during the pendency of the proceedings. That is, 
to divide the actual payment of debts during the action to protect 
one party or the other. Certainly the court was under the 
impression that the monthly house payments included an impound 
for taxes and insurance. But this was not the case. While a 
debt did exist against the property no monthly impound for taxes 
and insurance existed. Thus, no tax debt accrued and became 
due until the tax notices were sent to the parties. We submit 
that that debt did not then become due until November 30th, well 
after the entry of the Decree. Accordingly, it is the respondent's 
responsibility to pay for the tax debt. She was the one who 
occupied the premises, and it was to her that the property was 
ultimately awarded. 
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POINT II: 
ERRORS AS TO MRS. EARLY'S DEBTS PAID BY MR. EARLY 
We have argued that the district court committed error 
by refusing to grant Mr. Early a judgment against Mrs. Early 
for debts of hers paid by him which she had been ordered to pay 
by the court. The respondent's brief cites the general language 
of the Mutual Release (R.802) to support her position that she 
is released from paying Mr. Early back for the monies he paid 
towards her bills. This would be true if the release were a 
complete release as it appears to be initially. However, the 
court will note that the release provides as follows? 
"It is the intention of the parties that hence forth 
there shall be as betv/een them only such explicit 
rights and obligations as are specifically provided 
in the Stipulation and Property Settlement Agreement 
hereinabove identified and the judgment which issues 
pursuant thereto." R.805) [Emphasis added] 
Respondent's brief argues that " . . . the Release 
specifically preserved Mrs. Early's rights under the Property 
Settlement Agreement and Decree of Divorce, which in turn both 
specifically required Mr. Early to pay all debts he had been 
previously ordered to pay. Mr. Early never bargained for or 
received any such reservation of rights." (Respondent's brief, p. 
10) Wrong. It is clear from the language quoted above that 
any rights reserved under the Stipulation and Decree were mutually 
reserved# We see no language that limits this reservation to Mrs. 
Early alone. 
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Since this provision provides that the parties retain 
the rights set forth in the Decree, what does the Decree say 
on this matter? Paragraph 13 of the Decree (R.782) provides 
that: 
"The Plaintiff shall assume and pay the separate 
debts and obligations which she has incurred subsequent 
to the separation of the parties, excepting those which, 
by previous order of the Court, Defendant is obligated 
to pay, and shall indemnify and hold Defendant harmless 
therefrom." 
This provision is identical to paragraph 12 of the Stipulation. 
Mrs. Early is the plaintiff. The above provision in the Decree 
orders her to "assume and pay" the debts she incurred subsequent 
to the date of separation, excepting certain debts Mr. Early had 
been ordered to pay. There is no dispute that the debts for 
which Mr. Early seeks reimbursement were incurred subsequent to 
the date of separation. Certainly Mrs. Early's incorrect reading 
of the Release attempts to portray it as being unilateral in 
nature as to the reservation of rights. It is not unilateral. 
It is mutual. 
The reservation of rights being mutual the Decree of Divorce 
governs and that Decree specifically, and clearly, provides and 
requires that Mrs. Early pay for the debts for which Mr. Early 
seeks reimbursement. If the Release is as sweeping as Mrs. Early 
claims, then certainly she has no right making a claim against 
Mr. Earlv for taxes. Without question, then, Mrs. Early owes Mr. 
Early the amount claimed, and the court was in error in refusing 
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to enter judgment accordingly. 
POINT III: 
THE COURT VIOLATED RULE 52(a) 
Respondent argues that the court was not required to issue 
a basis for its opinion because she didn't bring her motion under 
any of the cited rules. The problem with this is that the 
Respondent doesn't cite any rule in her motion under which the 
motion is made. (R.875) Nor does she cite a rule in her brief. 
The only plausible position one could take in this regard is 
that the motion was a motion for summary judgment, falling under 
Rule 56. And as to the argument that Rule 52 limits the 
requirement to situations where the motion is made upon more than 
one ground, this applies only to motions made under Rule 59—not 
the other rules. 
We therefore submit that the court erroneously failed to 
issue a brief written statement and justify the basis for its 
ruling. 
CONCLUSION 
Concerning the tax debt, we submit that it was the court's 
intention to protect Mrs. Early from the monthly house payments 
during the pendency of the action. Not to protect her from tax 
debts on the property that were due after the entry of the Decree. 
There having been no monthly impound for taxes and insurance during 
the pendency of the action, Mr. Early's only obligation was the 
payment of the overall mortgage covering various pieces of property, 
including the family home. This he did. The tax notices would 
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not have been mailed until October, and Mr. Early was not aware 
of the debt until demand was made upon him well after the entry 
of the Decree in October. That tax debt was not delinquent until 
after November 30th7 subsequent to the entry of the court's Decree. 
As to the debts of Mrs. Early that were paid by Mr. Early, 
the Mutual Release is not unilateral in reserving to Mrs. Early 
obligations under the Divorce Decree. Both parties reserved the 
right to have the other party responsible for such matters as 
were ordered in the Decree. That Decree specifically provides 
that Mrs. Early is to pay for debts incurred by her after the 
date of separation. 
As to the failure of the court to justify its ruling by 
a written statement of some sort, Rule 52 clearly provides that 
the court make and enter a written statement setting forth the 
basis for its ruling. The plaintiff's motion was in all respects 
a motion for Nummary judgment, and therefore falls under the 
purvue of Rule 52. 
Respectfully submitted, 
BRANT H. WALL 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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